NYG UFA Class of '15: A fair price for past errors (long).

In judging NFL contracts, what matters is the money that's either guaranteed or effectively locked in by the prospect of a massive dead money hit. Of the six significant contracts given to unrestricted free agents by the Giants this week, none will tie the team's hands much, beyond the initial guarantees. (Thomas and Vereen are slight exceptions, and even those are debatable.) Here's how I see them:

Dwayne Harris
Guaranteed money: $7,100,000
Feasible exit: 2017
Annual comp prior to early exit: $4,000,000 ($8,000,000 over 2 years)
Dead money at early exit: $2,400,000

J.T. Thomas
Guaranteed money: $4,500,000
Feasible exit: 2017 (sort of feasible in 2016, but painful)
Annual comp prior to early exit: $3,500,000 ($7,000,000 over 2 years)
Dead money at early exit: $1,000,000

Shane Vereen
Guaranteed money: $4,750,000
Feasible exit: 2016 (could make a case for 2017)
Annual comp prior to exit: $4,850,000 (1 year)
Dead money at early exit: $2,333,334

Jonathan Casillas
Guaranteed money: $2,975,000
Feasible exit: 2016
Annual comp prior to early exit: $3,000,000 (1 year)
Dead money at early exit: $1,333,334

Marshall Newhouse
Guaranteed money: $1,000,000
Feasible exit: 2016
Annual comp prior to early exit: $1,725,000 (1 year)
Dead money at early exit: $400,000

Mark Herzlich
Guaranteed money: $400,000
Feasible exit: 2015
Annual comp prior to early exit: N/A (0 years)
Dead money at early exit: $450,000

I prefer annual comp to salaries because it smooths out the wild, year-to-year variations in NFL contracts. The common mistake made with annual comp, IMHO, is to include the years after the player becomes an easy cut. At that point, his salary is no longer a commitment; it's more of a call option that the team holds on his services. So, for example, the one part of Colin Kaepernick's contract that doesn't suck for the 49ers is the $45MM he's due in 2019 and 2020. If the team doesn't think he's worth it, they don't have to pay him.

Viewed in this light, the Giants have made a relatively small investment to fix a glaring hole in the middle section of their roster, the guys who would definitely dress tomorrow if there were a game, but who aren't expected to carry the team. The plausible best case for these signings is roughly as follows:
- On offense, Vereen will be a major contributor, Harris will play a significant supporting role as a receiver and blocker, and Newhouse will provide insurance as a decent swing tackle and extra goal-line blocker;
- On defense, Thomas and Casillas will both be prominent in certain packages, with at least one of them vying for a three-down role;
- On specials, where the impact should be greatest, Harris, Casillas and Thomas immediately become Quinn's best players, while Herzlich provides continuity, leadership and even a bit of skill.

Now, you can argue that the roles these signees will play ought to be filled with cheap bodies on their rookie contracts. In a perfect world, that's surely true. If Jayron Hosley's special-teams dynamism had translated from V-Tech to the NFL, and if Victor Cruz or Rueben Randle were a sure thing, Dwayne Harris wouldn't be a Giant today. If Brandon Mosley had offered any basis for confidence as a backup tackle, Marshall Newhouse would be unnecessary. If the Giants had used their fifth-round pick in 2012 on Danny Trevathan instead of trading it for Keith Rivers, or their 2013 fourth rounder on Gerald Hodges instead of trading up for Ryan Nassib, maybe they wouldn't be the market-makers for marginal linebackers. (Keeping in mind that Trevathan is currently rehabbing from surgery, Nassib is a fairly important Giant, and tons of other linebackers drafted in 2012 and 2013 have done nothing in the NFL.)

But hey - we are where we are. So Reese and Abrams have paid the price for Marc Ross's sins. One essential ingredient of good management is admitting mistakes and adapting plans to changed circumstances. Have the Giants overpaid? There's no way to know how competitive the bidding may have been for any of these players. To me, if anything close to the best case above materializes, the money is pretty well spent, even if the prices seem inflated. It's an auction market, and the greatest fool wins, not the smartest bidder.

And what about the worst case? If they are busts (for whatever reason), all six players can be gone in two years, and completely off the books after three years, with approximate total "smoothed" costs as follows:

2015: $17MM (Five active players plus dead money for Herzlich)
2016: $11MM (Two active players plus dead money for Vereen, Casillas and Newhouse)
2017: $3.4MM (Dead money for Harris and Thomas)
2018: $0

Would that outcome stink? Sure - on the ledger and on the field. But if the alternative is to stew over what Marc Ross might have done in the 2012 and 2013 drafts, I'll take the risk.