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It was dawn on Oct. 3, 2009, when nearly 350 Taliban-led insurgents attacked U.S. Army Combat Outpost (COP) Keating in the Kamdesh Valley of Afghanistan. Built on low ground in a river valley, the COP was home to fewer than 60 cavalrymen from Bravo Troop, 3rd Squadron, 61st Cavalry Regiment of the 4th Infantry Division. They would confront the enemy in a 12-hour close-contact battle that nearly became hand-to-hand combat. Outpost security would be breached in three places. Fires set by the attackers would destroy the COP's barracks. Close air support and mortar fire had to be directed at enemy forces inside the original security perimeter. ... The Battle for COP Keating produced a constellation of medals: 27 Purple Hearts, 37 Army Commendation Medals with "V" devices for valor, three Bronze Stars, 18 Bronze Stars with "V" devices, and nine Silver Stars. Staff Sgt. Clinton "Clint" Romesha recently received the Medal of Honor for his actions that day, and another soldier, Sgt. Ty Carter, has been recommended for one. The enemy death toll is estimated at between 150 and 200. Eight U.S. soldiers paid the ultimate price that day: Justin T. Gallegos of Tucson, Ariz.; Christopher Griffin of Kincheloe, Mich.; Kevin C. Thomson of Reno, Nev.; Michael P. Scusa of Villas, N.J.; Vernon W. Martin of Savannah, Ga.; Stephan L. Mace of Lovettsville, Va.; Joshua J. Kirk of South Portland, Maine; and Joshua M. Hardt of Applegate, Calif. |
I noticed one of these soldiers that died was from a town next to where I grew up. I followed the story backwards. He died doing what he always dreamed, as a soldier protecting our country.
As always Dunedin, thank you for sharing.
May they rest in peace, and their families remember find peace with their loss.
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May those brave souls rest in piece.
May those brave souls rest in piece.
Yeah RC even a swabbie can scratch his head over a base in a valley.
I find it fascinating that 60 well trained soldiers can be attacked, partially overrun and defeat an enemy when outnumbered 6 to 1. Cannot imagine the level a calm that must have been displayed by the NCOs and Officers to maintain the discipline necessary to fend off those odds for 12 hours.
That's the thing. That COP was not tactically sound, and it served little operational purpose, as the location was irrelevant in terms of the overall mission. It was scheduled to be shut down because of that reason. So whoever initially decided to locate the base there made a terrible call. The soldiers and their leaders on the ground did the best they could in a shitty situation they were placed in. The Brigade Commander (one of the better Army officers I have met) really wanted to shut the place down long before the attack, but he was prevented from doing so because someone in Bagram thought that the location was operationally and strategically important.
When you have more Americans on the ground isolated than there are actually Afghans to secure or whatever the hell the mission was, you are in effect just holding a real estate. And if you are going to hold a real estate, you would hope that the decision makers and those who should know better would make more sound tactical and operational decisions to ensure that they are setting the soldiers up for success.
The entire shit was fucked up from the beginning. And it wasn't the first time a base in such a shit location with limited operational significance was attacked (Wanat in the same district and same province) resulting in heavy US casualties.
And while I don't want to get into a larger debate about the oft idiotic strategy carried out by the US and its partners on the ground, these two bases and the attacks on them are clear indications of what bad strategy and bad leadership from up high can lead to.
Ugh...still pisses me off even after six years. The hours spent trying to get collections assets up there to support the soldiers on the ground and the CAS that was being called seemed to last a lifetime at the BCT HQ. It's the helpless feeling of not being able to help the soldiers on the ground more that eats away at you even all these years later.
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but IIRC there weren't a ton of sites in that part of Afghanistan large enough and flat enough to stick half a company. Ours was the exception for particular topographical reasons, but it was much better situated to control territory to the south than to the north.
That's the thing. That COP was not tactically sound, and it served little operational purpose, as the location was irrelevant in terms of the overall mission. It was scheduled to be shut down because of that reason. So whoever initially decided to locate the base there made a terrible call. The soldiers and their leaders on the ground did the best they could in a shitty situation they were placed in. The Brigade Commander (one of the better Army officers I have met) really wanted to shut the place down long before the attack, but he was prevented from doing so because someone in Bagram thought that the location was operationally and strategically important.
When you have more Americans on the ground isolated than there are actually Afghans to secure or whatever the hell the mission was, you are in effect just holding a real estate. And if you are going to hold a real estate, you would hope that the decision makers and those who should know better would make more sound tactical and operational decisions to ensure that they are setting the soldiers up for success.
The entire shit was fucked up from the beginning. And it wasn't the first time a base in such a shit location with limited operational significance was attacked (Wanat in the same district and same province) resulting in heavy US casualties.
And while I don't want to get into a larger debate about the oft idiotic strategy carried out by the US and its partners on the ground, these two bases and the attacks on them are clear indications of what bad strategy and bad leadership from up high can lead to.
Ugh...still pisses me off even after six years. The hours spent trying to get collections assets up there to support the soldiers on the ground and the CAS that was being called seemed to last a lifetime at the BCT HQ. It's the helpless feeling of not being able to help the soldiers on the ground more that eats away at you even all these years later.
Dune and RC thanks for that confirmation. The prosecution of war is not a clear thing and to purposely put ground troops at a tactical disadvantage from the get go is a "crime." This is probably what happens when politics gets involved - I'm assuming politics because of the desire to hold ground in this case.
Very clearly and nicely put, man.